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If there is one phrase that every student of constitutional 
law learns, it is that fundamental rights trigger strict scrutiny. As 
Justice William Brennan Jr. wrote, "a government practice or 
statute which restricts 'fundamental rights' or which contains 
'suspect classifications' is to be subjected to 'strict scrutiny' and 
can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government pur-
pose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is 
available." 1 According to Justice Clarence Thomas, "strict scru-
tiny" is the "appropriate standard" for "infringements of funda-
mental rights. "2 Justice Antonin Scalia has recognized that "strict 
scrutiny will be applied to the deprivation of whatever sort of 
right we consider 'fundamental."'3 
There is one small problem with this well-worn adage. It is 
simply not true. Fundamental rights do not trigger strict scrutiny, 
at least not all of the time. In fact, strict scrutiny-a standard of 
review that asks if a challenged law is the least restrictive means 
of achieving compelling government objectives-is actually ap-
plied quite rarely in fundamental rights cases. Some fundamental 
rights trigger intermediate scrutiny, while others are protected 
only by reasonableness or rational basis review. Other funda-
mental rights are governed by categorical rules, with no formal 
"scrutiny" or standard of review whatsoever. In fact, only a small 
subset of fundamental rights triggers strict scrutiny- and even 
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among those strict scrutiny is applied only occasionally. In short, 
the notion that government restrictions on fundamental rights 
are subject to strict scrutiny review is fundamentally wrong. 
Part of the problem may be that the Supreme Court has 
never bothered to define with any precision what counts as a 
"fundamental right." There are at least three possible defini-
tions. First, following footnote four of United States v. Carolene 
Products Co. ,4 we might consider all of the individual rights 
guaranteed in the first eight amendments in the Bill of Rights to 
be fundamental. Second, we might alternatively view all of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights that have been incorporated to 
apply against the states to be fundamental; the test for incorpo-
ration asks if a right is fundamental to American political institu-
tions and our system of justice. Finally, we might define as fun-
damental those rights that have been thought of as "preferred 
rights" because of their role in promoting human dignity or de-
mocratic self-government. Any way you slice it, however, not all 
fundamental rights trigger strict scrutiny. 
I consider each of these three definitions of fundamental 
rights and show that, regardless of the definition used, the old 
saying about strict scrutiny is descriptively wrong. Laws infring-
ing upon fundamental rights are sometimes subject to strict scru-
tiny, but often they are not. 
I. THE FUNDAMENTAL BILL OF RIGHTS 
Like so much of modern American constitutional law, the 
false notion that laws infringing upon fundamental rights are re-
viewed under strict scrutiny has roots in footnote four of 
Carolene Products. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone famously wrote, 
"There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption 
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be 
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of 
the first ten amendments. "5 Ever since, constitutional law profes-
sors have taught their students that the individual rights guaran-
tees found in the Bill of Rights trigger heightened review, while 
economic rights (such as those read into the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process clause by the Lochner Court)6 receive 
only rational basis protection. And half of that lesson is true. But 
4. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
5. !d. 
6. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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that half is the part about economic rights, not the part about 
heightened review for the rights spelled out in the text of the Bill 
of Rights. 
The Court has never purported to apply strict scrutiny in 
every provision of the Bill of Rights. Of the "first ten amend-
ments" referred to in footnote four, a grand total of two trigger 
strict scrutiny. Laws invading on First Amendment rights of 
speech, association, and religious liberty are often subject to 
strict scrutiny, as are laws that restrict the due process and (in-
visible) equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. 
But strict scrutiny is nowhere to be found in the jurisprudence of 
the Second Amendment, the Third Amendment, the Fourth 
Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment, 
the Eighth Amendment, the Ninth Amendment, or the Tenth 
Amendment. Two amendments trigger strict scrutiny; eight do 
not. 
Let us look at the Bill of Rights provisions a bit more 
closely. The Second Amendment protects the right to bear 
arms-or, more accurately, does noe -but in Second Amend-
ment cases the Court will uphold challenged laws so long as they 
have a "reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency 
of a well-regulated militia. "8 The Court has justified the lack of 
strict scrutiny here by suggesting that there are rights "far more 
fundamental" than those protected by the Second Amendment.9 
The Third Amendment, which protects against the quarter-
ing of troops in one's home, has never triggered strict scrutiny 
(or, for that matter, any other standard). As the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals recently noted, "Judicial interpretation of the 
Third Amendment is nearly nonexistent. "10 Should courts one 
day find reason to consider the Third Amendment, perhaps strict 
scrutiny will be adopted. To date, however, there has been no 
opinion in a Third Amendment case using that standard. 
Unlike the Third Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, 
barring unreasonable searches and seizures, has bred volumi-
nous case law. Yet the Court does not apply strict scrutiny to 
governmental searches and seizures; it applies a reasonableness 
test. Of course, the reasonableness language comes from the text 
of the amendment itself. Still, the Court certainly could create 
7. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
8. See id. at 178. 
9. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55,66 (1980). 
10. Custer County Action Ass'n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1043 (lOth Cir. 2001). 
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substantive requirements of "reasonableness" that mimic strict 
scrutiny. For instance, the Court could hold that any search that 
is more overinclusive than necessary is constitutionally unrea-
sonable, effectively adopting strict scrutiny's fit requirement.n 
But the Court has very clearly declared in recent years that such 
precision is not required. In Vernonia School District 471 v. Ac-
ton, the Court insisted, "We have repeatedly refused to declare 
that only the 'least intrusive' search practicable can be reason-
able under the Fourth Amendment."1 Searches and seizures are 
thus not strictly scrutinized. 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not treated to 
strict scrutiny protection either. Indeed, in Sixth Amendment 
cases, we do not find any type of standard evocative of tiered 
scrutiny. Rather, the Court uses categorical rules to "implement" 
the right to counsel. For instance, the right is violated if the gov-
ernment refuses to provide a criminal defendant access to coun-
sel after the defendant has asserted the right. 13 The courts do not 
ask what reasons the government had for the denial or whether 
the denial was narrowly tailored to achieve the government's 
ends. If the government violates the rule, the denial of counsel is 
unconstitutional. 
Categorical rules such as this could substitute for strict scru-
tiny if, in practice, they created the same heavy burden on the 
government to defend the constitutionality of the underlying 
state action. But in Sixth Amendment doctrine, the burden is on 
the individual, not the government, to show that he has been de-
nied the right. And the substantive rules themselves- the precise 
elements or facts that the individual has to prove to win-favor, 
rather than disfavor, the government. To prove an ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim, for example, the defendant must show 
that counsel's performance was patently unreasonable and that 
the shoddy performance actually harmed the defendant. 14 This 
test is exceedingly hard to meet. A strict scrutiny substitute, by 
contrast, should make the individual's job easy and the govern-
ment's job hard. 
The right to a civil jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh 
Amendment is governed by categorical rules-such as that 
which holds that Congress cannot statutorily deny the right to a 
II. See Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief 
of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REv. 383,436-37 (1988). 
12. Vernonia School Dist. 471 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,652-53,663 (1995). 
13. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986). 
14. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984). 
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jury in a controversy involving private, as compared to public, 
rights15 -and, when Justice Thomas writes for the Court, analogy 
based on historical exegesis. 16 A Westlaw search turns up no 
Seventh Amendment decisions in which a federal court applied 
• • 17 
stnct scrutmy. 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail, excessive 
fines, and cruel and unusual punishments. Laws challenged on 
Eighth Amendment grounds are adjudicated primarily by cate-
gorical rules, most of which strongly favor the government. For 
example, the bar on cruel and unusual punishments prevents al-
most nothing short of exile/8 burning at the stake, or pillorying.19 
(And, with the war on terror in full swing, that short list may 
soon be even shorter.) In reviewing criminal sentences under the 
Eighth Amendment, the courts engage in some balancing to en-
sure proportionality between the offense and the sentence.20 
Quite the opposite of strict scrutiny, however, this balancing is 
weighted in favor of the 9overnment; only grossly disproportion-
ate sentences are invalid. 1 
The Ninth Amendment, as Robert Bork reminded us, is just 
an "ink blot" with no real meaning in contemporary constitu-
tionallaw.22 In the absence of any contemporary controlling Su-
preme Court case law interpreting this provision,23 it remains un-
clear what standard of review would apply in a Ninth 
Amendment case. 
The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states and the peo-
ple the residual powers not granted to the federal government. 
15. See Gianfranciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,51-52 (1989). 
16. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, 523 U.S. 340,348-54 (1998). 
17. Westlaw search: "seventh amendment" Is "strict scrutiny" in the federal courts 
database, conducted April17, 2006. 
18. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-D3 (1958) (noting that torture is barred by 
the Eighth Amendment). 
19. See In re Kremmler, 136 U.S. 436,446 (1890). 
20. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
21. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997-98 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (describing the Eighth Amendment's proportionality requirement); Coker v. Geor-
gia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that imposition of the death penalty for the crime 
of rape was grossly disproportionate and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment). 
22. See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAW 166 (1990). But see RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION 224 et seq. (2004) (finding many pretty images in the Ninth Amend-
ment's ink blot). 
23 .. There is some contemporary interpretive case law that is not controlling. See, 
e.g., Gnswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (re-
lymg on the Nmth Amendment to protect the fundamental right of marital privacy). 
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Worse than an ink blot, the Tenth Amendment has been labeled 
a "truism"24 that "added nothing to the [Constitution] as origi-
nally ratified. "25 Traditionally, Tenth Amendment disputes were 
not even justiciable,26 although in recent years the Court has 
breathed life into the amendment and relied on it to support ju-
dicial rulings circumscribing federal power.27 The Court has held 
that the amendment reflects an inviolable principle of the consti-
tutional structure under which the federal government must re-
spect the sovereignty of the states. The Court has been explicit 
that balancing of the interests, such as we might expect with 
some form of scrutiny, has no place in the Tenth Amendment 
context.28 
So, of the ten provisions of the Bill of Rights, the vast ma-
jority does not trigger strict scrutiny. Perhaps this is normatively 
wrong, and courts should apply strict scrutiny to laws invading 
each of these rights. But descriptively, as a matter of current 
constitutional doctrine, strict scrutiny is not the standard of re-
view applied to laws invading all the textual provisions of the 
Bill of Rights. If these are the rights that are properly thought of 
as "fundamental," then clearly the ancient wisdom about strict 
scrutiny is incorrect. Strict scrutiny only applies in the doctrines 
emerging from two of the ten provisions in the Bill of Rights, the 
First and Fifth Amendments. Even then, as we will see, strict 
scrutiny is only occasionally the applicable standard. 
II. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF INCORPORATION 
A second way to define what rights are "fundamental" is 
through the doctrine of incorporation. Under the Supreme 
Court's "selective incorporation" approach, only the most fun-
damental provisions of the Bill of Rights-those whose denial, in 
the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter, "shocks the con-
science" -are incorporated. 29 In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court 
held that incorporation is appropriate when "a right is among 
24. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
25. See United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716,733 (1931). 
26. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
27. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,919-22 (1997). 
28. See id. at 932 ("It is the very principle of separate state sovereignty that such a 
law offends, and no comparative assessment of the various interests can overcome that 
fundamental defect.") (emphasis in original). 
29. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 209 (1952); see also Powell v. Alabama, 
287 U.S. 45, 67-68 (1932) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment because of the "funda-
mental character" of the right to counsel). 
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those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at 
the base of all our civil and political institutions."30 In theory, 
then, incorporated rights are fundamental rights. 31 
All incorporated rights may be fundamental, but not all in-
corporated rights trigger strict scrutiny. As noted above, there is 
no strict scrutiny found in Fourth Amendment doctrine, Sixth 
Amendment doctrine, or in the case law emerging from the in-
corporated provisions of the Eighth Amendment. Strict scrutiny 
is only used in the doctrines of two incorporated provisions of 
the Bill of Rights: the First and Fifth Amendments. 
In 1897, the Fifth Amendment became the first provision in 
the Bill of Rights to be incorporated against the states.32 Pedi-
gree aside, the Fifth Amendment only requires strict scrutiny 
some of the time. Strict scrutiny analysis is not used in cases al-
leging a violation of the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, 
which protects private property from being appropriated without 
compensation by the government. The Court uses a deferential, 
rational basis-like scrutiny to review the constitutionality of so-
called "regulatory takings" under Penn Central Transportation v. 
New York. 33 A similar type of deferential review is used to de-
termine if a taking meets the textual requirement of "public 
use. "
34 In "excessive exaction" cases, the Court applies a form of 
heightened review when the regulation completely annihilates 
the economic value of the property/5 but it is not strict scrutiny 
and the cases are few and far between. 
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination does 
not trigger strict scrutiny either. It is governed by categorical 
rules, although these have some strict scrutiny-like bite. The 
government faces an onerous task to show that an exception 
30. 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
31. In practice, most of the Bill of Rights has been incorporated. Unincorporated 
areas include the Second Amendment, see Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); the 
Third Amendment, see ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES 383 (1st ed. 1997); the Fifth Amendment's right to criminal indictment by 
grand jury, see Hutardo v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); the Seventh Amendment's 
right to civil jury trials, see Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 
(1916); and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of excessive fines, see Browning-Ferris 
Indust. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.2 (1989). 
32. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 
(1897). 
33. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
34. See Kelo v. New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2664 (2005) ("For more than a cen-
tury, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scru-
tiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs 
justify the use of the takings power."). 
35. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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should be made from the exclusionary rule barring the use of a 
defendant's testimony acquired from a custodial interrogation 
conducted without adequate Miranda warnings. Exceptions are 
only allowed for compelling reasons, such as public safety or the 
integrity of the judicial process.36 Here, we see at least traces of 
strict scrutiny even if the traditional formulation is not invoked. 
The two clear sites of Fifth Amendment strict scrutiny are 
its guarantees of due process and equal protection37 - the sub-
stance of which are effectively coextensive with the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. These 
provisions protect the fundamental rights of privacy, to marry, to 
travel, to vote, and of equal citizenship. Strict scrutiny is usually 
applied to laws interfering with these rights, but not always. 
Consider the right to privacy. Laws burdening a woman's 
right to abortion were subject to strict scrutiny review under Roe 
v. Wade. 38 The Court derived that decision's well-known trimes-
ter framework from strict scrutiny analysis. Under that frame-
work, the Court invalidated nearly all pre-viability abortion re-
strictions, including parental notification laws, informed consent 
requirements, and 24-hour waiting periods.39 In Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey,40 the Court reaffirmed the "central holding" of 
Roe, while at the same time the joint opinion (and later a major-
ity of the Courtt discarded the strict scrutiny-based trimester 
framework in favor of the more lenient "undue burden" test.42 
The right to abortion was not deemed to be somehow less fun-
damental; indeed, the joint opinion argued that "[t]hese matters, 
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment."43 Nevertheless, strict scrutiny was no longer appli-
cable. Some commentators have argued that the undue burden 
standard is more like a form of intermediate scrutiny or even ra-
36. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984) ("public safety" exception); 
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (impeachment of testimony exception). 
37. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (reading an equal protection 
guarantee into the Fifth Amendment). 
38. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
39. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (invalidating a parental 
notification requirement under Roe); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 
462 U.S. 416 (1983) (invalidating a waiting period under Roe). 
40. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (joint opinion). 
41. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
42. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876. 
43. Id. at 851. 
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tional basis review.44 Alternatively, one might read Casey to es-
tablish a categorical rule: if the law is determined to be an undue 
burden it will be invalidated, but otherwise the law will be up-
held. In any event, the undue burden test is clearly more tolerant 
of regulation than traditional strict scrutiny, as indicated by the 
fact that Casey upheld several laws similar to ones that had been 
invalidated under Roe, including parental notification, informed 
consent, and 24-hour waiting periods.45 
More recently, the fundamental right to privacy triggered 
only rational basis review in Lawrence v. Texas. 46 The Court did 
not state unambiguously that the right involved was "fundamen-
tal," leaving some confusion. But the underlying right extended 
from a line of cases, such as Griswold v. Connecticut47 and Roe, 
which clearly did recognize privacy to be a fundamental right. 48 
The Court also explained that the "right to liberty under the 
Due Process Clause gives [the petitioners] the full right to en-
gage in their conduct without intervention of the government,"49 
and such substantive due process rights are usually considered 
fundamental. Despite the importance of the underlying right, the 
Court only required that that the law be justified by a "legiti-
mate state interest"50 - the language of the rational basis test. 
This was perhaps a rational basis with some bite, however, as the 
Court invalidated the law. Yet it was just as clearly not the strict 
scrutiny formulation one would expect for a fundamental right. 
Subsequent to Lawrence, the sole federal circuit court decision 
to date to address the question of Lawrence's standard of review 
held that it was rational basis review.51 
The Fifth Amendment's implicit equal protection guarantee 
does not always require strict scrutiny, either. Intermediate, not 
strict, scrutiny is applied to sex discrimination.52 Alienage dis-
44. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standilrd: Orient-
ing Casey in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025, 2033 (1994); Deb-
orah A. Ellis, Protecting "Pregnant Persons": Women's Equality and Reproductive Free-
dom, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 967,976 (1996). 
45. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-900. 
46. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the majority's stan-
dard was rational basis review. See id. at 586,599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
47. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
48. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-66 (majority opinion). 
49. !d. at 578. 
50. !d. 
5 I. See Lofton v. Secretary of Dep't of Children & Family Scrvs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 
(11th Cir. 2004). This circuit court decision is not without controversy. See Mark Strasser, 
Rebellion in the Eleventh Circuit: On Lawrence, Lofton, and the Best Interests of Chil-
dren, 40 TULSA L. REV. 421 (2005). 
52. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001). 
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crimination leads courts to apply strict scrutiny in some circum-
stances,53 but only rational basis review when the discriminatory 
law is federal (and thus governed by the Fifth, not Fourteenth, 
Amendment ).54 
In short, even rights fundamental enough to be incorpo-
rated do not always trigger strict scrutiny. And even those that 
do, like the Fifth Amendment (and, as we will see below, the 
First Amendment), only do so some of the time. 
III. FUNDAMENTALLY PREFERRED RIGHTS 
A third definition of "fundamental rights" limits them to an 
even smaller subset of rights: so-called "preferred rights,"55 such 
as the freedom of speech, the freedom of religion, the right to 
vote, the right to marry, and the right to privacy.56 The Court has 
not made clear precisely why some rights are to be preferred 
over others, but traditional theories emphasize that some rights 
are so central to self-government and human dignity as to war-
rant special judicial protection. According to Laurence Tribe, 
these rights "touch[] more deeply and permanently on human 
personalit~ [and] came to be regarded as the constituents of 
freedom." 7 
We have already seen that one of these "preferred rights," 
the right to privacy, does not always activate strict scrutiny. The 
same goes for other preferred rights. For example, as Michael 
Dorf has shown, the courts often avoid applying strict scrutiny to 
laws infringing on fundamental rights by claiming that the in-
fringement is only an incidental burden on the right.58 Although 
even incidental burdens are, according to Dorf, "real infringe-
ments of rights," the courts often apply only a lower level scru-
tiny- or none at all- absent a "substantial burden. "59 Dorf finds 
this approach common in speech, religion, and privacy cases.60 
Here, the courts have effectively created a way around strict 
53. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,376 (1971). 
54. See Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,79--80 (1976). 
55. See Henry 1. Abraham, Fundamental Rights, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1176,1177 (Leonard W. Levy eta!. eds., 2d ed. 2000). 
56. See id. at 1177; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 770 
(2d ed. 1988) (identifying "preferred rights"). 
57. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 56, at 770. 
58. See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1175, 1179 (1996). 
59. !d. 
60. Seeid. at 1199-1200. 
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scrutiny even for laws burdening our most basic, core individual 
rights. 
Even preferred rights that ordinarily trigger strict scrutiny 
do not do so when the individual challenger is himself, shall we 
say, "unpreferred." Convicts, for example, are subject to having 
their most fundamental rights of speech, to marry, and of privacy 
denied by prison officials, and courts will only apply a lenient, 
rational basis-type of review to such policies under Turner v. Saf-
ley.61 Although insisting that "[p]rison walls do not form a barrier 
separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitu-
tion" and that "when a prison regulation or practice offends a 
fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will dis-
charge their duty to protect constitutional rights,"62 Turner held 
that such a regulation will be "valid if it is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests. "63 "Subjecting the day-to-day 
judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analy-
sis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security 
problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable 
problems of prison administration."64 Consequently, the funda-
mental rights of prisoners are not clothed with strict scrutiny 
protection. 
So what if the individual is not an inmate and the burden on 
a preferred, core right is more than incidental? Strict scrutiny 
must apply, no? No. 
Perhaps the most preferred of all rights is the freedom of 
speech, the so-called First Freedom. Yet strict scrutiny is not al-
ways applied in free speech cases. Traditional speech doctrine 
distinguishes between regulations that are content-based and 
those that are content-neutral. The former generally trigger 
strict scrutiny, but the latter do not. Content-neutral laws that 
limit the freedom of speech are subject to the much more defer-
ential standard of United States v. O'Brien,65 under which laws 
are regularly upheld.66 Even content-based speech regulations do 
not always receive strict scrutiny treatment. If the content regu-
lah;d is commercial speech, the courts apply a form of interme-
diate review established in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. 
61. 482 u.s. 78 (1987). 
62. !d. at 84 (quotations and citations omitted). 
63. /d.at89. 
64. !d. 
65. 391 u.s. 367 (1968). 
66. SeeDorf, supra note 58, at 1204. 
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v. Public Service Commission of New York. 67 A similarly less 
stringent form of review is applied to content-based regulations 
when the government is acting as an employer (as compared to a 
sovereign) under the rule of Pickering v. Board of Education. 68 
These First Amendment doctrines have led Ashutosh Bhagwat 
to characterize intermediate scrutin~ as the "test that ate every-
thing" in free speech jurisprudence.6 
Free exercise of religion- another preferred right found in 
the First Amendment-does not always trigger strict scrutiny. 
Although the Warren Court adopted strict scrutiny for free ex-
ercise claims in Sherbert v. Verner,70 the Rehnquist Court over-
turned that choice of standard in Employment Division v. 
Smith,71 which held that strict scrutiny was inappropriate for gen-
erally applicable laws burdening religious practice. For claims 
for exemptions from generally applicable laws, which make up 
the majority of religious liberty controversies,72 the Constitution 
now only requires rational basis review. One might even read 
Smith to mean that the free exercise clause no longer provides 
constitutional protection from generally applicable laws. Fortu-
nately for religious adherents, federal statutory law reinstated 
strict scrutiny for many claims for exemptions. The case law un-
der these statutes, the Religious Freedom Restoration Ace3 and 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act,74 raise 
the additional question of what it means to apply "strict scru-
tiny." Despite the formal use of this standard, courts uphold laws 
against claims for religious-based exemptions in three of every 
four cases (74%).75 Even where courts claim to apply compelling 
interest analysis, the scrutiny is not always so strict. 
Courts may prefer strict scrutiny when adjudicating the con-
stitutionality of laws burdening preferred rights, but that practice 
67. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
68. 391 U.S. 563 (1968); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006) (hold· 
ing that government may discipline employees for speech made pursuant to official du-
ties). 
69. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in 
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
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is hardly uniform. If the burden is less than substantial or the af-
fected individual is a prison inmate, strict scrutiny is not applied. 
Moreover, even the most basic First Amendment rights of 
speech and religious liberty are only given the protection of strict 
scrutiny in some, not all, cases. 
CONCLUSION 
There are three ways of defining what rights are "funda-
mental," but no matter which definition is used, strict scrutiny is 
not applied to all laws invading the rights included in the defini-
tion. Courts employ a host of standards and categorical rules in 
fundamental rights cases, with strict scrutiny only used from time 
to time. 
In one sense, none of this story about fundamental rights is 
new to law professors or judges. Constitutional law professors 
teach the O'Brien and Central Hudson tests year in and year out, 
and judges apply those less-than-strict standards regularly in the 
course of their duties. I make no claim to have discovered 
Xanadu. But the old adage about laws infringing fundamental 
rights being subject to strict scrutiny remains a favorite of schol-
ars, judges, and law students. And it is flatly wrong. 
Perhaps the notion remains popular because it makes a 
rather complex doctrinal reality quite simple and easy to memo-
rize. Such simplicity, however, comes at considerable cost: year 
after year, lawyers repeat an equation that does not add up, 
breeding confusion and misunderstanding about how constitu-
tional law works. It is time the fundamental truth be told: laws 
infringing upon fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny, 
but only some of those rights, only some of the time, and only 
when challenged by some people. 
